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Var gasangrebet i Syrien i 2013 orkestreret af det 
syriske styre? Hvor mange døde? Var det ulovligt i 
henhold til international lov? Anna Leander viser i 
denne artikel, at disse spørgsmål var centrale ikke 
blot for afdækningen af episoden, men også for 
udpegningen af, hvilken ekspertise der autoritativt 
kunne udlægge sandheden om gasangrebene. 
Kemikere? Læger uden grænser? Jurister? Artik-
len giver et blik ind i et paradoksalt landskab, hvor 
ekspertise er essentiel, men også konstant udfor-
dret. Og sådan skal det forblive, mener Leander. 
Kun ved konstant at udfordre ekspertudsagn kan 
vi bevare en åben og demokratisk dialog.
Introduction
On 21 August 2013, sarin gas was used in the Ghouta 
area of Damascus. Th e incident triggered debates involv-
ing the voices ranging from those of bystanders to twitter 
readers, from presidents to peace activists and issues rang-
ing from how to deal with the medical symptoms related 
to sarin to what responsibility the „international commu-
nity“ had and how the attack would or should fashion the 
strategy for resolving the confl ict in Syria. A bewildering 
variety of contradictory views were advanced on what the 
core questions pertaining to the attack were and what to 
think about them. Th ose advancing them all demanded 
to be heard and taken into account in the formulation of 
political strategies. Many of them were. Hence weapons 
experts, chemical analysts, medical experts, international 
relations scholars, anthropologist, psychiatrists as well as 
lay observers (local or not) were brought into the discus-
sion. To further increase the plurality of voices these ex-
perts drawing on the same kind of knowledge, disagreed 
among themselves. Experts clearly did not speak with one 
voice, nor did their multiple voices tell a single story with 
unambiguous implications for strategies of action. Th is 
role of expertise in public debate is far from unique to the 
debate about the sarin gas attack in Ghouta. It is char-
acteristic of contemporary controversies more generally. 
Th e safe days when (at the least the illusion that) experts 
could be consulted to give policy-makers unambiguous 
and reliable answers regarding issues such as whether or 
not there was a sarin gas attack in Ghouta and what pri-
orities of action should follow are defi nitely gone. But 
what has replaced it? Or as this special issue asks: how is 
one to understand the role of expertise in the knowledge-
expertise-policy nexus?
For some scholars the answer is a welcome weakening 
or perhaps even demise of expertise and expert rule. Th e 
dethroning of „experts“ from their positions as core advi-
sors to the princes of the present is signalling the end to 
unjustifi ed privileges and the specifi c power-knowledge 
relations they re-produce. It is a welcome democratiza-
tion of expertise signalling the end of the naïve belief in 
singular, universal and incontestable forms of knowledge 
(e.g. Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Th is is the position of 
scholars of what Collins and Evans term „the second wave 
of science and technology studies“ (Collins and Evans 
2002). Scholars riding this wave focus primarily on „the 
problem of legitimacy“ of expertise and on the inclusion 
of „lay“ or „non-certifi ed“ expertise. Th ey concentrate 
much of their energy on critiquing universal knowledge 
and the construction of undisputable „facts“ (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979). Inversely, for others the unruly presence 
of multiple, contradictory and incompatible expertise in 
any public controversy is profoundly disturbing. Th e em-
battled nature of expertise, they fear, could spell the end 
of reasonable public debate, based on arguments groun-
ded in (much needed) scientifi c/technical knowledge, 
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and instead replace it with a relativist cacophony where 
the most powerful voice silences all other voices. On this 
account, the most urgent task is to reinstate and reaffi  rm 
the authority of genuine expertise (e.g. Schudson 2006). 
Th is position has come to be shared by what Collins and 
Evans call „the third wave“ of science and technology 
studies. As Collins and Evans themselves, these scholars 
are disturbed by the relativist and normatively distur-
bing implications of opening up and politicizing the core 
of science. Th ey think „critique has run out of steam“ 
and think there is a need for „trust“ as Latour puts it in 
specialized knowledge (Latour 2004 ; 2012 respectively). 
While not denying, the insights of the „second wave“, 
their core concern has shifted. Th ey discuss „the problem 
of extension“.2
Th is article argues for a third position. It suggests 
that expertise has been subjected neither to a welcome 
dethroning nor is it (on its way to) a much needed resto-
ration. Rather, expertise has continued to hold an abso-
lutely essential and profoundly embattled position in the 
knowledge-expertise-policy nexus and this duality of the 
and rather than the clarity of an either or is to be wel-
comed. Indeed, precisely because expertise is so essential 
and inescapable it is important that it also remain embat-
tled. One way of situating this argument in relation to the 
waves rolled into this text a paragraph ago, is to present it 
as placed at the point where the second and third waves 
of the social studies of science break into each other. Al-
though the two waves are usually presented, including by 
their core proponents, as separate and their corresponding 
positions on the role of expertise as contradictory or even 
incompatible, the position argued for in this article is 
that they are intimately connected and mutually reinforc-
ing. Th e third wave’s concern that specialized knowledge 
remains indispensable is well taken and that therefore 
thinking about how to disentangle expertise from hoax, 
how to deal with „the problem of extension“, is well taken. 
Th is is the point where the second wave joins the third. 
To deal with the „problem of extension“ the critique at 
the heart of the second wave discussion has to be mobi-
lized. It cannot simply be pushed aside and the problem 
dealt with through ever more refi ned distinctions among 
forms of expertise and of science (as Collins and Evans 
would have it). Rather, to ensure that expertise continues 
to re-produce „matters of concern“ and not „matters of 
fact“ we need to follow Latour’s suggestion and swing the 
„sword of criticism“ (Latour 2004: 227). However, we 
may have to swing it rather more widely and forcefully 
than Latour would like. Pursuing his customary battles, 
Latour directs his sword solely against his mythical arch 
enemy, the „critical approaches“ from „Criticalland“ 
(230) commanded, as usual, by a Pierre Bourdieu (229) 
fi gment of Latour’s imagination. According to Latour, 
this army that purportedly threatens the Latour empire of 
reason fails to understand „the material“, „the thingness 
of things“ (245), the „folds“ of their generation (235), and 
therefore falls back on untenable „fairy positions“ (237) 
and „conspiracy theories“ (228) (page numbers are from 
Latour 2004). 
While not disagreeing that it is important to mobilize 
the insights of Latour and others (sic3) about materiality, 
the position argued here is that if the sword is to cut any 
diff erence, and hence be able to ensure that matters of 
concern do not turn into matters of fact, it will need the 
force also of the broader critique vilifi ed by Latour but 
largely integral to the second wave of the social studies 
of science. For expertise to remain embattled „critique“ 
is needed. Th e article highlights three such „critiques“: 
those focussed on the market for ideas, on technolo-
gized processes, and on regulatory/legal processes. Since 
theorizing in abstract makes little sense – Latour and 
Bourdieu are in touching agreement on this point – the 
article draws on the sarin gas attack of 21 August 2013 
to unpack this argument about how the knowledge-ex-
pertise-policy nexus is to be understood.4 It begins by 
demonstrating that expertise is essential to policy in the 
sense that expertise (or better a constellation of exper-
tise) is constituted in the political controversies which 
expertise in turn defi nes. Th e second section argues that 
because this is the case, it is to be expected and welcomed 
that expertise remains embattled. It is only through a 
constant process of refl exive contestation that expertise 
can be guarded against closure. Th e article consequently 
concludes that a pertinent question to pose regarding the 
contemporary knowledge-expert-policy nexus is how to 
understand and cultivate a paradoxical expertise that is 
essential and embattled; independent and authoritative 
and political and contested. 
Essential Expertise 
Once upon a time, there was a land where the link between 
the province of scientifi c knowledge and that of policy-
making was mediated by disinterested „experts.“ Experts 
translated „objective“ scientifi c knowledge that could be 
mobilized in the public interest. Walter Lippmann’s de-
pictions of this land are probably the most authoritative. 
On his account: experts were „people who cultivated the 
habit of discounting their own expectations… who tried 
to put aside their own interests and wishes when they ex-
amined the world, and [who were therefore] the best hope 
to save democracy from itself.“ Lippmann did not suggest 
that the „experts run the government but that the elected 
offi  cials who run the government call on experts“ (cited 
and interpreted by Schudson 2006: 492). Whether or not 
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Lippmann, or anyone else, thought that the relations be-
tween science, expertise and politics ever worked in this 
way anywhere in the real world is uncertain. But even 
if Lippmann land was a mythological place, it was (and 
remains) a point on the political map that many wished to 
move to. As such the unattainable ideal of a singular, un-
contested expertise continues to haunt engagement with 
the knowledge-expert-policy nexus. However, as this fi rst 
section argues, while it is amply clear that such a role for 
expertise and experts is profoundly unrealistic, it does 
not follow that expertise has become insignifi cant or that 
it has vanished. On the contrary, expertise remains es-
sential albeit in a diff erent way. Expertise, in the sense of 
specialized knowledge plays an absolutely essential role 
in informing policy in a complex world, where science, 
technology and local knowledge from a wide range of 
places is crucial.5 But as the plural in places indicates, 
expertise is no longer essential in singular but in plural. 
One might say that the second wave has won a practical 
victory of sorts. Moreover, precisely because it is no longer 
singular, expertise is essential not as a stable body of pre-
existing knowledge that draws on a neatly defi ned science 
and then communicates results on which policy-makers 
can draw. Instead, expertise is re-produced in relation to 
specifi c controversies (scientifi c and political) which the 
specifi c enactment of expertise in turn re-produces. Gone 
is the map with tidy lines linking a science that informs 
an expertise that informs a policy. We are in a place radi-
cally diff erent from Lippmann land but one where, just 
as in Lippmann land, expertise continues to be essential 
albeit in a very diff erent way. Th is section draws the con-
tours of this place with reference specifi cally to the sarin 
gas attack.
A plurality of experts
In the controversy around the sarin gas attack, „experts“ 
from widely diff erent fi elds came forth to contend that 
their area of knowledge was the most salient for policy. 
Chemical analysts, weapons experts, medical experts, 
area studies experts and human rights lawyers but also 
„non-scientifi c“, „lay“ knowledge not certifi ed by acade-
mic degrees or professional recognition such as that held 
by charity organizations or Ghouta inhabitants with pho-
nes and webcams were competing for attention. To make 
the situation even more complex, from within each of 
these areas of knowledge, there was disagreement about 
what kind of expertise is the best. What kind of chemical 
expert, for example, was most credible? Was it a chemist 
walking „the fi eld“ in Syria? Someone with a research 
record on sarin gas specifi cally? Or, perhaps, a chemist 
with broad competencies who could assess a range of di-
verse evidence? 6 Th ere is no simple, agreed upon answer 
to these questions. However, they were as inescapable in 
the context of the sarin gas attack as they would be in 
relation to any controversy. „Scientists disagree“ Douglas 
and Wildawsky laconically entitle chapter three of their 
classical essay on „the selection of technological and en-
vironmental dangers“(Douglas and Wildawsky 1982).7 If 
they had written the essay today, they would have had to 
insist (more than they do in that book) that there is also 
disagreement about who the scientists are and even more 
profoundly on whether or not scientifi c (rather than lay) 
knowledge should be the foundation of expertise.
In the sarin gas controversy, as in other contemporary 
controversies, this plurality and uncertainty over what 
expertise deserves to be consulted is not only acknowl-
edged and expected. It is also welcomed. Th e contempo-
rary approach to expertise is one encouraging multiplic-
ity and variety; voices are to be „heard“ and dialogues, 
consultations and debates are expected (e.g. Irwin 2006). 
Public consultations, fora and interdisciplinary platforms 
on core policy questions are fl ourishing. Arguably, the 
„professionalism [which] has been the main way of insti-
tutionalizing expertise in industrialized countries“ (Ab-
bott 1988: 323) is giving way to a multifarious, fl uid 
and contestable system of expertise. As Helga Nowotny8 
suggests expertise has become „transgressive“ in the sense 
that it is constantly transgressing conventional limits and 
boundaries between academic and policy-making fi elds 
(Nowotny 2000). She traces this change to macro level 
changes in our societies that have transformed the sta-
tus of knowledge and expertise.9 Nowotny, as most other 
researchers dealing with the knowledge-expert-policy 
nexus, therefore thinks the pluralization of knowledge is 
here to stay. Th e Lippmann land image of a policy-makers 
consulting experts mediating information from a distant 
but easily identifi able province of scientifi c knowledge 
is fading. Th e province of knowledge is as hazy as is the 
understanding of which experts could mediate from it. 
Th is however does not imply that experts can be dis-
pensed with. Policy-makers need specialized knowledge 
when they approach any complex question, including 
that of how to understand the sarin gas attack in Ghouta 
and what to do about it. In that sense, expertise remains 
essential. However, it is an essential role marked by a 
constant uncertainty about which expertise exactly is es-
sential. Th e answer to that question is provided in the 
controversy itself as experts of diff erent kinds are pulled 
into and engage the debate. One might in that sense say 
that controversies produce expertise.
Controversy and the production expertise
Th e pluralization of expertise has made the inherently 
contestable choices among competing, incompatible and 
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even incommensurable expertise more visible. „Th ere is no 
realistic chance for any kind of scientifi c body or advisory 
committee to reassert their claims to a monopolistic con-
trol of scientifi c authority“ on any given issue, Nowotny 
insists (2000: 19). As a consequence expertise is selected 
in the absence of agreement about the criteria for selec-
tion. Th is makes the choice vulnerable to critique, and 
inescapably so. Even the most elaborate eff orts to justify 
reliance on specifi c forms of expertise will be subjected 
to criticism. For example, the UN report on the sarin gas 
attack (UN 2013) was the work of an expert team headed 
by senior, established, experienced authorities from a va-
riety of fi elds and with their base in international insti-
tutions rather than a country.10 To further bolster their 
expert status, the team produced a report of 40 pages of 
which 31 pages (sic) were scientifi c appendixes. Of the 
fi ve pages constituting the main text, one page is devoted 
to method, in a context where the „narrative and results“ 
are covered in two pages (UN 2013). Th is did not stop the 
critique. Th e Russian political establishment responded 
by questioning the expertise on which it rested. President 
Putin declared it „utter nonsense“ and was backed up by 
his Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov who called 
the report „distorting and one-sided“ and demanded an 
„independent investigation“ (BBC 2013b). In the sarin 
controversy, as elsewhere, expertise was visibly and con-
testably selected. Expertise and policy were not separate 
but intrinsically linked.
Th is visible intertwining of policy and expertise has 
far reaching implications for the status of the expert in 
the knowledge-expert-policy nexus. Th e involvement of 
specifi c experts in the policy-making process is what 
confers the expert status upon them and makes their 
knowledge appear interesting and viable. Th e decision 
to ground the UN mission on the heads of international 
organizations, rather than on academic researchers or 
intelligence professionals – or a mixture of these – re-
affi  rmed a specifi c understanding not only of which ex-
pertise should be consulted for this case, but of what 
expertise on the sarin gas attack was in the fi rst place. 
It re-produced a specifi c understanding expertise. Even 
more strongly, this re-production of expertise is of more 
than punctual signifi cance in the sense that its conse-
quences go beyond the sarin gas issue. It is inscribed in a 
longer history and a broader context. Th e selection of ex-
pertise mirrors current understandings and institutional 
structures for handling expertise which they in turn con-
tribute to re-shaping – in the dual sense of replicating 
and changing – the experts consulted gain recognition, 
standing and usually also funding through the process. 
Even if experts are not directly paid for their services 
(which of course they usually are), proven „relevance“ is 
a core concern for those funding knowledge producing 
activities. It is formally integrated as one of the criteria in 
many research evaluations. Th is is why as Jasanoff  insists 
(in the context of courts’ selection of and reliance on 
scientifi c expertise) that, one of the „more subtle fi ndings 
from ethnography and sociology [is that] expertise often 
does not pre-exist the disputes the expert is summoned 
to settle, but is contingently produced within the very 
context of disputation“ (Jasanoff  2003: 159).
Th e expertise that continues to play an essential role 
in the knowledge-expertise-policy nexus is in other words 
not only plural, it is also produced in relation to the con-
troversies. Th is wreaks havoc with the idea that there is a 
pre-existing clearly defi ned expertise that can merely be 
pulled into policy and used to settle controversies in the 
manner most favourable to a (somehow known) public 
interest. As has just been argued the precise constella-
tion of expertise that will be drawn upon is formed in 
the controversy in a way which will have ramifi cations 
for expertise beyond the specifi c controversy. So while 
expertise is essential, it is expertise that is not only plural 
but intrinsically tied to the controversy itself and, as the 
following section underlines, also essential in generating 
the controversy.
Expertise generated controversies
Th e role of contemporary expertise is anything but one 
of settling and closing controversies. On the contrary, ex-
pertise plays a core role in posing the overarching ques-
tions and hence generating and defi ning controversies. 
Experts have the specialized knowledge to ask questions 
and hence to generate the specifi c form controversies take. 
Th eir area of knowledge and work will make them see the 
problem diff erently. Is the sarin gas attack mainly about 
who might be held legally responsible for the attack (as 
the International Humanitarian law specialist would have 
it)? Or, mainly about how to deal with its consequences 
for the internally displaced civilian population (as a mi-
gration studies scholar would ask)? Or, is it about the 
balance between the opposition and the government (as 
the strategic specialist might wonder)? Or, is it about the 
environment or any other topic on a potentially very long 
list? Moreover, for each overarching question, expertise 
is core for formulating the most pertinent way of mov-
ing further in specifying the controversy. If the overarch-
ing question is responsibility for the attack; should focus 
be directed rather towards what kind of warheads can 
be used to carry out a sarin gas attack, how they match 
with the warheads found on the ground in Ghouta, from 
what location they could be launched or on knowledge 
of the strategies, capabilities and ambitions of those in-
volved in the confl ict? Th e answer will be a combination 
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of overarching questions and ways of specifying them. 
As a whole, the combination of questions gives form to 
the controversies that produce controversies such as those 
surrounding the use of sarin gas in Ghouta.
Second, and directly related, expertise generates con-
troversies by providing answers to the multiple questions 
it raises. Since expertise is indeed plural, the answers it 
provides also are. Th ey therefore become the subject of 
controversies in their own right. Th is is true even on the 
seemingly most technical issues. For example, the UN 
report analysed the trajectory of the chemical weapons, 
concluding that they must have been launched from the 
government held Mount Qassioun. A team of researchers 
headed by Th eodor Postol, a professor of technology and 
national security at MIT, reviewed the UN photos (sic) 
and reached the opposite conclusion. It argued that „...
the fl ight path analyses in particular were, ‘totally nuts’ 
because the range of the improvised rockets was ‘unli-
kely’ to be more than two kilometres“ (cited in Hersch 
2013: 10). A controversy over the trajectory ensued. Th e 
expertise in plural generated around controversies play a 
core role in making controversies visible both by formu-
lating the controversial questions and by questioning the 
answers provided to them. Expertise is in other words 
essential but in a diametrically opposed way from the one 
suggested by the classical Lippmannian understanding of 
it. Th e essential role of experts is not to provide answers 
to a predefi ned question but to provide the questions that 
structure the controversy and then make the contestabi-
lity of the answers visible. Th is understanding of what 
expertise is and does entails such as radical break with the 
conventional connotations of expertise that some prefer 
to drop the reference to expertise altogether. For example 
Callon et al. write: 
„Another notion, equally omnipresent in the 
literature, has disappeared: that of the expert.. 
[because]… the situations that interest us do 
not turn so much on available skills and the 
decisions to be made as on the modes of 
organizing the process of production of 
knowledge and on the measures to be 
implemented in order to re-launch the double 
exploration on the basis of fi rst lessons“ 
(Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthess 2009, 228). 
Dropping the notion of expertise in this way may be help-
ful to clarify processes by getting rid of the Lippmanian 
connotations of the word. However, it has little relation 
to a reality which is replete with expertise, expert con-
sultations, expert panels, expert interviews, and expert 
opinions. We live in „Expert Raj“ that is in an empire led 
by experts (Jasanoff  2012: 11). Th e route followed here is 
therefore a diff erent one; it is to acknowledge the essential 
role of expertise in the knowledge-expert-policy nexus 
while insisting that this expertise is very diff erent from 
the classical one discussed by Lippmann. Contemporary 
expertise is plural and must be understood as generated 
in the controversies it is generating. Th at is knowledge, 
expert and policy may form a nexus but it is one where 
they are no longer neatly separable and their respective 
nature and roles therefore need to be radically rethought.
Embattled Expertise
Th e expertise in this revamped guise may remain essen-
tial. However, its fl uid, changing and questioning char-
acter obviously also makes it exceedingly contested. Th is 
makes easy score points for all those who have long in-
sisted that expertise is easily manipulated by the powers 
that be. It is also water on the mill of those who point 
out that expertise is (and can be) nothing but situated 
knowledge, the particular point of view of the experts 
who mediate it. Th e many „turns“ of the winding social 
sciences road – including the critical, the feminist, the 
post-colonial, the linguistic, the post-linguistic, the aes-
thetic, the practice, the new material etc. etc. – have led 
to a place far away from the Lippmann land of benevo-
lent expertise. Th ose who have followed the turns fi nd 
themselves in a place where expertise is integral to power 
knowledge practices that are performative in generating 
specifi c subjectivities and tied to hierarchies, race and 
gender relations. If the argument about the essential na-
ture of expertise holds, this is a very uncomfortable place. 
Expertise will not and cannot disappear. Nor can the 
politics of expert knowledge be neutralized. For people 
who have followed these turns, Collins and Evans’ project 
of trying to delimit safe provinces for specifi c kinds of 
science and specifi c types of expertise consequently car-
ries less promise than Latour’s sword swinging project 
aimed at those who try to turn „matters of concern into 
matters of fact“ (Collins and Evans 2007 ; Latour 2004). 
Latour’s sword swinging is aimed precisely at defending 
the space for keeping expertise controversial (or embat-
tled) when countering the worries of relativism. Latour 
allows the third wave of science and technology studies 
to roll into the second wave rather than just behind it as 
Collins and Evans would have it. Th e problems of legiti-
macy meet, and are used to solve, the problems of exten-
sion. However, Latour’s depiction of how this defence of 
„matters of concern“ works is misleadingly narrow. La-
tour’s ritual struggles against the mythological „critical 
approaches“ prevent him from acknowledging – let alone 
take on board – the relevance of their insights for his 
work. Most signifi cantly it prevents him from accepting 
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their insights regarding how a wider context plays into 
the processes that prevent matters of concern to turn into 
matters of fact. Yet, the force of these critical insights 
is necessary if Latour’s sharp sword is to be eff ectively 
swung and swung against the right target. Th is section 
elaborates this point by discussing three such insights. It 
suggests that critical insights about the broader context 
created by markets for ideas, technological systems and 
regulatory processes shape constellations of expertise and 
have been to be made integral to eff orts to keep expertise 
embattled. Th ese three insights have played a prominent, 
but not exclusive, role in the discussions surrounding the 
knowledge-expert-policy nexus. Picking them up is a way 
of showing that, contrary to Latour’s rendering of them, 
these (and other) critical insights are neither operating 
in the shadows nor are they dulling the Latourian sword 
of critique. Th ey are important if that sword is to cut a 
diff erence.
Criticizing the „market for ideas“
Th e initial Russian reaction to the news that sarin gas had 
been used in Damascus was to say that this was simply a 
lie. Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, who was one of those 
insisting publicly on this, said he knew the attack had 
been fabricated on the basis of fake evidence and manipu-
lated images. His arguments seem to have been based 
largely on the analysis a Carmelite nun (Agnes Mariam 
de la Croix) had made of the YouTube images posted 
almost immediately after the fact (Mackey 2013b). She 
argued amongst other things that these images had been 
posted before rather than after the event and that there-
fore they had to be fabricated or at least did not docu-
ment a supposed sarin attack on 21 August. De la Croix’s 
analysis turned out to hinge on a misunderstanding of 
how the time is attached to YouTube images. Nonethe-
less, her analysis for a while fi gured as central expertise in 
the discussion. De la Croix was not the only non-certifi ed 
expert to partake in the debate. In fact, a large share of 
the initial debate about the deaths from the sarin gas at-
tack has been based on evidence gathered by lay experts. 
„Th e strikingly precise US total [of 1492 deaths] was later 
reported to have been based not on an actual body count, 
but on an extrapolation by CIA analysts, who scanned 
more than a hundred YouTube videos from Eastern Gh-
outa into a computer system and looked for images of the 
dead“ (Hersch 2013). Th is death count was then held up 
against alternative ones. Including for example that made 
by Medecins sans Frontières (MSF) who counted 355 deaths 
in their work on the ground (BBC 2013a). As this shows, 
the estimates on something as basic as how many people 
died in the sarin gas attack in Ghouta have varied from 
zero (as claimed that no such attack took place) to 1429. 
All of the estimates drew on some form of expertise. But 
obviously the experts cannot all have been right and some 
(de la Croix for example) were certainly more wrong than 
others. Th e question is how to settle who – that is how – 
to decide which expertise to trust and rely on.
One common answer is that of generating an open 
and participatory discussion as a way of establishing 
what expertise is most relevant. Th e competition among 
confl icting expertise will sort the hoax from the expert, 
ensuring that the best, most relevant and solid knowledge 
prevails. As Mirowski has argued in detail, this idea has 
much in common with Hayek and the Montpellerin So-
ciety’s idealization of markets in general: just refrain from 
interfering and the market will sort it out. In this case, 
the market for ideas will settle the issue too complex for 
limited and corruptible people to deal with. Markets will 
ensure that the best possible constellation of expertise is 
discussed and prevails. Th e diffi  culty is that ideas do not 
fl oat freely in an unfettered market. Rather they are artic-
ulated by people with positions and in contexts that sys-
tematically (dis)advantage some ideas over others. Russia 
can decisively shape what is produced as expertise, as can 
Fox news or the Ford Foundation. De la Croix’s analysis 
would not have featured prominently in the debate if the 
Russian foreign ministry had not seized it for its own 
purposes while MSFs analysis might have been far more 
infl uential if the US intelligence had picked up on it. But 
more fundamentally some forms of expertise might be 
silenced altogether if spoken in a language that cannot 
be understood by other participants in the debate. Th is is 
what Spivak means when she insists that the „subaltern 
cannot speak“ (Spivak 1988). Th ere is therefore no guar-
antee that simply allowing people with claims to exper-
tise to speak and participate in a „market for ideas“ will 
produce some optimal constellation of expertise. Th is is 
true however much one derides those „afraid of markets“ 
(Callon 2007) and insist that „markets and delegative 
democracy work hand in glove. Th ey mutually reinforce 
each other“ (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthes 2009: 237). 
As Mirowski argues „the Achilles heel of neoliberalism is 
that it gets the functions of markets in society all wrong: 
Markets are not only limited and intermittently unre-
liable information processors; they can equally well be 
deployed to produce ignorance“ (Mirowski 2011: 318).
Scholars writing from within Actor Network Ttheory 
(ANT) / the social studies of science acknowledge that 
sometimes markets may produce ignorance. Latour even 
grants the production of ignorance through markets a 
place of honour in his analysis of the „aff ects of capital-
ism“ (Latour 2014). However, neither Latour nor other 
ANT/Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars 
seem willing to make this insight bear on their own un-
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derstanding of how matters of concern can be sustained 
and expertise remain embattled. Instead they put their 
trust in an open discussion. As Callon et al. put it: 
„In the absence of hybrid forums that extend, 
debate, and reorganize them, markets 
quickly become contested, illegitimate, and 
sources of inequity and injustice [...] Let’s free 
markets from the supposedly natural laws 
that the most extreme liberals doctrines 
attribute to them, so that they are able to take 
in the proposals produced by the hybrid 
forums that manage their weaknesses“ 
(Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthes 2009: 328).
Pointing to the importance of accepting hybrid forms of 
knowledge is not particularly satisfying. It merely dis-
places the problem; how can the „hybrid fora“ or hybrid 
knowledge escape the (disturbingly visible and system-
atic) inequality of the participants in the market for 
ideas? Questioning the YouTube analyses by de la Croix 
is important, but it would not have mattered at all unless 
Russia had incorporated it into its expertise. Questioning 
the analysis of the CIA may be equally important but it is 
infi nitely more diffi  cult. Th e market for ideas, the hybrid 
fora, or the open debates are unlikely to provide much 
assistance in that regard. On the contrary, they will tend 
to reinforce – not counter – the exclusionary bias towards 
the already infl uential and their expertise at the exclusion 
of others. Th e defence of matters of concern and embat-
tled expertise is therefore strengthened by critique of the 
market idea, not weakened.
Contesting Technological Systems 
Along similar lines, while ANT/ STS scholars have con-
tributed greatly to thinking about the hybrid nature of ex-
pertise, they have been surprisingly reluctant to acknowl-
edge the extent to which technologies also become part of 
a context that fashions (and biases) the way that expertise 
is reproduced in relation to specifi c controversies. Indeed, 
reference to technologically grounded knowledge is often 
presented as authoritative and somehow imbued with a 
superior precision and objectivity that raises it above that 
of other forms of knowledge. Th is was true also in the dis-
cussion that has surrounded the sarin gas attack in Syria. 
For example, the anchoring of intelligence expertise in 
technological systems was used to bolster the US position 
on the attack. When the initial assessment of the situation 
was presented, it was done in a way that made it seem as if 
„the government and Kerry’s comments made it seem as if 
the administration had been tracking the sarin attack as it 
happened. It is this version of events, untrue but unchal-
lenged, that was widely reported at the time“. (Hersch 
2013) A vague reference to technologically grounded ex-
pertise11 made possible a „White House misrepresentation 
of what it knew about the attack matched by its readiness 
to ignore intelligence that would undermine the narra-
tive“ (Hersch 2013). To show the fragile nature of this 
interpretation, Hersch mounted a case, based on the in-
formation provided by the same sources, showing that the 
attack could very well have been launched by rebel groups 
and more specifi cally by the Al-Nursi militia that has al-
ready experimented with the use of sarin gas. However, 
not only did Hersch’s interpretation of the data receive 
scant attention (as might have been expected considering 
the argument just made about the market of ideas), more 
generally the claims made by the US government met 
almost no critique. Th ey seemed to enjoy an immunity 
of sorts partly linked to their technological foundation. 
Th is raises fundamental questions about the way techno-
logical systems – such as the CIA observation systems in 
Syria – feed into the contexts in which expertise constel-
lations emerge and bias the form these constellations end 
up taking; that is about the way technologies are not only 
„actants“ in expertise constellations (as most ANT/STS 
would treat them) but part of the context that shapes 
what kinds of actants (and agents) will become relevant 
to these expertise constellations.
Critical approaches to technologically grounded, hy-
brid, knowledge have a long tradition for working on 
these questions. Th ey direct attention beyond the obvious 
fact that technological expertise is prone to manipulation 
of the powers that be. Th is critical work has long insisted 
on the importance of questioning the way that technolo-
gies does not only become part of singular expert constel-
lations but also refashion the contexts within which these 
constellations emerge. An early version of this argument 
was made by Ursula Franklin.12 Franklin insisted that 
many – in fact most – contemporary technologies are 
„prescriptive“ in the sense that they prescribe what can 
and should be done. 13 Th e sensors installed to monitor 
the chemical weapons arsenal in Syria and the signals 
they were programmed to pick up to provide „early warn-
ings“ prescribed a specifi c form of observation focussed 
on given assumptions of threats. As other „prescriptive 
technologies“ they therefore „eliminate occasions for de-
cision making and judgement in general and especially 
for the making of principled decisions. Any goal of the 
technology is incorporated a priori in the design and is 
not negotiable“ (Franklin 1992: 25). Arguably, the move 
to the digital and to „big data“ has accentuated and ac-
celerated this displacement of „principled decisions“. It 
locates these within the technologies themselves. Indeed, 
integral to the move to big data has been a view that 
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data can just be amassed for no particular purpose and 
then mobilized when it is needed (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier 2013), as were the audio-recordings from 
Syria. What is glossed over is that the data thus gathered 
prescribes observation; it restricts observation to what 
the data allows for. Th e technological system defi nes the 
parameters of (in)visibility. Even more strongly, contem-
porary technologies often have „emergent“ qualities; they 
integrate the results of their own observations and evolve 
accordingly. Algorithms therefore come to take over a 
range of very principled decisions (e.g. Amoore 2011), 
including in the military fi eld (Beard 2009 ; Sharkey 
2010).14 
Critical insights in other words have directed atten-
tion to the ways in which technology refashions the con-
text in which expertise constellations are defi ned. Tech-
nology „prescriptively“ (to use Franklin’s term) plays a 
core role in defi ning what kind of expertise is most rel-
evant. It often does so by placing technological processes 
at the heart of that relevance to the extent that these 
solutions sometimes become completely independent of 
controversies and debates (as is the case when technolo-
gies have „emerging characteristics“). Technologies eff ec-
tively squeeze Latour’s matters of concern into matters of 
fact. As Franklin points out: 
„with the predominance of prescriptive 
technologies in today’s world – technolo-
gies that have taken over like a giant 
occupation force […] We have lost the 
institution of government in terms of 
responsibility and accountability to the 
people as people. We now have nothing 
but a bunch of managers who run the 
country to make it safe for technology“ 
(Franklin 1992: 117 and 120).
For Latour’s sword to be an eff ective weapon in the 
defence of matters of concern would seem to require a 
more strategic position on how it can stop this „giant 
occupation force“. To date, the process of refl ection on 
this question has not progressed very far. In fact, even 
seeing the problem is made diffi  cult by the summary and 
rejection of all things „critical“. In a seemingly naïve, 
unrealistic and ultimately self-defeating way, Latour is 
barring himself from drawing on the strength of these 
critical approaches to make his defence stronger. Indeed, 
recovering the debate about principled decisions (or poli-
tics) and inversing this trend involves critically examining 
how technologies are refashioning the context in which 
expertise constellations are defi ned.15 It involves ensur-
ing that technologically grounded expertise … such as 
that underlying the White House assessment of Syrian 
government responsibility for the sarin gas attack on Gh-
outa – remains embattled. Criticizing, as Hersch does, 
the interpretations and usages of technological expertise 
is important; so is questioning the bias and logics built 
into the technologies even if it is more diffi  cult and de-
mands allying with vilifi ed critical approaches. 
Questioning regulatory procedures
Last but not least, and still along the same line of argu-
ment: ANT / STS scholars place enormous emphasis on 
the processes through which constellations of expertise 
emerge and remain embattled. In Callon et al.’s words: 
„the situations that interest us do not turn so much 
on available skills and the decisions to be made as on 
the modes of organizing the process of the production 
of knowledge“ (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthes 2009: 
228 emphasis added). Yet, they are surprisingly reluc-
tant when it comes to bringing in the biases, the exclu-
sions and the closure tendencies that are integral to these 
processes themselves; that is to look critically at these 
processes themselves and to question the purported ob-
jectivity and neutrality of these processes. Tellingly, the 
concluding chapter of Latour’s fascinating study of the 
making of law argues that law is made much more in line 
with the common preconception of how science is made, 
than science itself (Latour 2010). Th is is intended as a 
provocation to established views of how the sciences func-
tion. However, it also is revealing of the extent to which 
Latour’s willingness to lend regulatory processes, espe-
cially the formal legal ones, precisely the kind of uncon-
troversial, singular status that he refuses to grant science 
and scientifi c processes. Yet as critical (yes again) work 
on law has long insisted this is profoundly misleading. 
And, there is no need to resort to a critical mysticism or 
metaphysics to discover this; on the contrary. Th e contro-
versies surrounding regulatory processes provide ample 
and visible confi rmation of it. 
Th is is true also of the procedures surrounding the 
processes regulating the role of the constellation of ex-
pertise in relation to the sarin gas attack in Ghouta. Th e 
processes regulating intelligence expertise in the US for 
example were amply criticized and contested both from 
within and from outside the circles of professional in-
telligence. Th e original US assessment of the incidence 
insisted on the real time monitoring of the situation 
(White House 2013). Th is led to very serious critique of 
US intelligence experts: Why had there been no warn-
ing if they knew? Not surprisingly this (re-)opened a de-
bate about the regulation of how intelligence expertise 
is mobilized and used. Shawn Turner, a spokesman for 
the director of national intelligence publicly protested 
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against the manipulation when he fl atly rejected his gov-
ernment’s version: „Let’s be clear, the United States did 
not watch, in real time, as this horrible attack took place. 
Th e intelligence community was able to gather and ana-
lyse information after the fact“ (cited by Hersch 2013). 
In even stronger terms, the group „Veteran Intelligence 
Professionals for Sanity“ published a memorandum to the 
president arguing that the White House assessment was 
a „political ploy“ and that „CIA Director John Brennan 
is perpetrating a pre-Iraq-War-type fraud on members of 
Congress, the media, the public – and perhaps even you 
[president Obama]“ (VIPS 2013 ; also Mackey 2013a). 
Inversely, David Cole who has specialized in the law sur-
rounding US intelligence gathering and handling (e.g. 
Cole 2012, 2003), analysed the way intelligence was dealt 
with in the sarin gas crisis as a „new turn“ and the end-
ing of the abusive practices associated with the „war on 
terror“ because the process involved Congress and public 
debate (Cole 2013b, 2013a). Statements such as those by 
Shawn Turner, by the VIPS or David Cole focus on the 
process through which expertise is made relevant.. 
Th is debate about regulatory processes for involving 
intelligence expertise shows the extent to which those di-
rectly involved talk about the signifi cance of the broader 
context of regulatory procedures – including the most 
formal legal ones – for stabilizing expertise and hence also 
of the importance of keeping these processes contestable. 
Th is dovetails nicely with the insights of critical work in 
law which insists that legal expertise is one form of exper-
tise among others. As Martti Konskenniemi insists when 
he discusses the role of legal experts in politically conten-
tious situations „By Th eir Acts You Shall Know Th em... 
(And Not by Th eir Legal Th eories)“(Koskenniemi 2004). 
Logically and by prolongation, it is important to insist 
with critical legal analysis that legal procedure is no more 
of a distant province whose experts can mediate knowl-
edge to policy than are other specialized knowledge. Law 
reproduces its own biases. As Koskenniemi puts it: 
„the distinctive contribution of alternative 
styles [of legal reasoning] lies in their ability to 
shed light on mainstream law’s hidden 
priorities, the way legal translation articulates 
some participant values but fails to do so for 
other values. Much feminist and postcolonial 
writing has undertaken precisely this task. 
The introduction of human rights or environ-
mental claims into the law is a familiar 
outcome of such renewalist ‘imagining’ earlier 
in the century“ (Koskenniemi 1999: 358).
Legal knowledge is on par with other forms of knowl-
edge. Not only are legal experts therefore part of a knowl-
edge-expert-policy nexus. Law is no safe-haven where one 
can fi nd shelter from the disputes (such as the one over 
procedures) and judge them at a distance (Leander and 
Aalberts 2013). Th e current use of „lawfare“ – the mobi-
lization of law in support of the own warfare – makes this 
disturbingly clear (Dunlap 2008 ; Beard 2009). Critical 
legal scholarship has played a core role in drawing atten-
tion to this and hence in underscoring the limits of wish-
ful thinking exporting the responsibility for ensuring 
that expertise remains embattled to law. Th e Latourian 
defence of matters of concern would certainly do better 
if it also placed this insight behind its swinging sword. 
To sum up, expertise in plural continues to be es-
sential in political debates. Plural expertise is necessarily 
also embattled; it crystallizes in changing constellations 
around evolving matters of concern and not in a singular 
predefi ned form around unchanging matters of fact. It is 
therefore of essence (as Latour persuasively insists) to resist 
closing and exclusionary processes. However, to do so it is 
not enough to show that expert constellations are hybrid 
and changing and hence resist the singular and universal. 
It is also important to resist the process through which 
the broader context in which the constellations emerge 
imposes closures and exclusion. Th is section has argued 
this point with reference to the market for ideas, tech-
nological systems and legal processes. Th e overarching 
point is that hasty dismissals of critical insights because 
of an ancestral resentment à la Latour appears not only 
unwarranted but risky. To rephrase a statement made by 
Jasanoff  : „for all practical purposes we live in ‘Expert 
Raj’ (an imperium of experts)“. It is therefore important 
that their „modes of acquiring authority, especially in 
global institutions“ do not remain as „opaque to ordinary 
citizens“ or to anyone else „as the self-legitimating claims 
of rules in distant metropoles were to colonial subjects 
living in the peripheries of empire“ (Jasanoff  2012: 11). To 
ensure that they do not it is important that expertise be 
as embattled as it is essential. Integrating critical insights 
is of essence for this to happen.
Conclusion: Cultivating Paradox
Th e argument in this article has taken us to a place of 
paradox. On the one hand, it has insisted that expertise is 
essential. However, plural, malleable, contextually gener-
ated, and however much expertise creates the controver-
sies it is supposed to analyse, expertise is authoritative 
knowledge that remains essential. As such it demands to 
be trusted. Th erefore Latour insists on the creation of a 
„trust“ in the institutions of science each with their own 
specifi c language and regime of truth (Latour 2012: 155: 
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30 and passim). On the other hand, as this article has 
insisted, expertise is embattled and in fact must remain so 
if it is to be more than the expression of already privileged 
views. To contest something is diametrically opposed to 
trusting it. Indeed, a conventional way of understanding 
authority is as that which is accepted and hence neither 
imposed nor contested (Arendt 1958 ; Krieger 1977).16 
To insist that the knowledge-expert-policy nexus in con-
nection to the sarin gas attack has relied on essential and 
embattled expertise is to say that it has been paradoxical 
in the strictest sense of the word. 
In the academic world, but also beyond, many would 
expect a conclusion such as this to dissolve the paradox; 
to off er some routes away from it or perhaps some advice 
for how to move away from it practically. Th ose debating 
expertise would probably expect a return to a suitable 
refurbished version of what I have termed Lippmann land 
above. No such conclusion is intended or forthcoming. 
On the contrary, as the argument above has made amply 
clear, not only is expertise, in relation to the sarin gas con-
troversy and beyond, both essential and embattled; this 
dual characteristic plays a fundamentally important role. 
It ensures that Expert Raj does not become an arbitrary 
tyranny of experts. Perhaps this insistence on paradox is 
no surprise. After all „political reason never proceeds in 
a straight line“ (Latour 2012: 333). Speaking politics is 
all about taking the detour generating the issues, views 
and ultimately the public that politics is about.17 It is 
about speaking in curves or perhaps even circles as Latour 
would have it (Latour 2012: 155). Th ere is no reason to 
think that speaking about the inherently political exper-
tise in the contemporary knowledge-expert-policy nexus 
should be any diff erent. Speaking curves does not dissolve 
the paradox though. It off ers a possibility to live with it 
and perhaps even to cultivate it. Th ere is a dearth of sug-
gestions for how this position can be enacted in practice. 
Th e article therefore concludes (as the caricature aca-
demic must) that „more research is needed“ and research 
of a very specifi c kind: namely research that focuses on 
how to deal with and cultivate the paradox of embedded 
and embattled expertise.
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1. An earlier version of this argument was presented at the public 
discussion: „Syrienskonfl ikten – løsninger bordet“ (30 September 
2013) co-organized by ToRS and the Centre for Resolution of In-
ternational Confl ict (http://cric.ku.dk/). CRIC also supported the 
research for this article. I thank the editors and anonymous review-
ers for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Stefano Guzzini 
for taking time to talk expertly about expertise.
2. „Problem of extension“ refers to diffi  culties arising from the frag-
mentation of knowledge and the multiplicity of actors pertinent to 
expertise on any given subject. Most central among these diffi  culties 
is the problem of legitimizing specialized knowledge.
3. As Haraway puts it with reference to Latour (and as has been re-
peated many times since) „..the science studies scholars aren’t 
reading or listening−or both“ to insights from other scholars; and 
Haraway is concerened mainly about „critical scholars in antiracist, 
feminist cultural studies of science and technology“ (Haraway 1997: 
35).
4. Th e controversy surrounding the sarin gas attack in Damascus is 
in other words not a „case“ analysed with the help of a „theoretical 
framework“. Rather, the sarin case provides the insights about the 
ways in which knowledge, expertise and policy are linked in the 
contemporary world. Th ese „insights“ constitute the „theoretical 
claims“ made in this article; they illustrate the contextually specifi c 
processes and mechanisms that link knowledge-expertise-policy. 
Th ese processes diff er from existing signifi cant understandings (the 
article argues for a „third position“) and hence refi ne existing theo-
rizations. 
5. Th is point is made repeatedly by Beck who insists on the paradox 
that on the one hand we increasingly trust science to help us under-
stand risks that are „invisible“, except for science while on the other 
hand science is also increasingly marred by distrust as stemming 
from internal disagreements and external distrust (Beck 1992: 45 
e.g.).
6. I borrow this framing trilogy from Jasanoff ’s classifi cation of dif-
ferent kinds of claims to expertise along the axis of objectivity and 
experience (Jasanoff  2012: 200). Jasanoff  has also usefully devel-
oped an analysis of the trajectories making diff erent countries tend 
to re-produce specifi c forms of expertise legitimation or what she 
calls „civic epistemologies“ (Jasanoff  2012: 200: 72).
7. Th eir general point is that the selection is culturally re-produced 
and hence dovetails nicely with Jasanoff ’s point that the experts who 
select them are linked to specifi c scientifi c cultures.
8. Helga Nowotny been a central participant in the scholarly debate 
about the the knowledge-expert-policy nexus. She has also been 
core in fashioning the politics in the area by holding key positions 
including that of president of the European Research Council.
9. She emphasises two core processes: „One process, linked to the rise 
of the rational and informed individual in the dual role of con-
sumer and citizen, has led to what appear to be irreversible changes 
in the decision-making structures of liberal Western democracies. 
Th e other process, equally wide-ranging in impact and probably 
also irreversible, has led to the emergence of a societally distributed 
system of knowledge production, which is no longer confi ned to in-
stitutional monopolies or knowledge bases organized along strictly 
disciplinary lines.“ (Nowotny 2000: 18).
10. Th e mission was headed by Åke Sellström (Professor specialized in 
chemical weapons and working for the Swedish Defense Research 
Agency), and supported by the director of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Scott Cairns, and Maurizio 
Barbeschi, the head of the World Health Organization.
11. Th e written version of this assessment epitomizes this. It informs 
its readers that „all-source assessments are based on human, sig-
nals, and geospatial intelligence as well as a signifi cant body of 
open source reporting. Our classifi ed assessments have been shared 
with the U.S. Congress and key international partners. To protect 
sources and methods, we cannot publicly release all available intel-
ligence“ (White House 2013).
12. A Canadian physicist, feminist and peace activist (Franklin 2006 
for an overview).
13. Obviously the notion of prescriptive technologies has many pen-
dants including in Foucauldian work on „technology“ (which 
Franklin sites) or in Kittler’s „cultural technologies“ (Kittler 1999) 
or in Haraway’s „cyborgs“ (Haraway 1991). 
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14. I do not know if emergent technologies were used in observing 
Syria before or during the sarin gas attack. However, considering 
the centrality of this kind of technology in routine reconnaissance, 
surveillance and intelligence it is certainly not impossible.
15. Franklin outlines a series of questions she thinks must and should 
be systematically put to any plan or project involving technological 
expertise – that is, the overwhelming majority of initiatives taken 
in the contemporary world (1992: 127-9).
16. „If authority is to be defi ned at all, then, it must be in contradistinc-
tion to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments“ 
(Arendt 1958: 93).
17. Bourdieu’s way of making the point was to insist on the „mystery of 
ministry“ whereby the minister creates the community/interest s/he 
is representing in the process of representing it. For an elaboration 
of the argument see (Wacquant 2005). 
